Abstract-A new revision of IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol is currently being developed, which will include revised specifications regarding security. The security mechanism consists of two verification approaches, immediate and delayed; we implemented both approaches on top of PTPd, an existing open source implementation of PTP. We support the immediate verification security approach using manual key management at startup, and we support the delayed verification security approach emulating automated key management for a set of security parameters corresponding to one manually configured time period. In our experiments, we found that added performance cost for both verification approaches was within 25 µs, and PTP synchronization quality remained intact when security was enabled.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the ability to measure time has become increasingly more accurate, so have emerged more applications in which increased accuracy is necessary. IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) was released in 2002 [1] and revised in 2008 [2] and provided a standard for developers to follow in order to satisfy the nanosecond level time synchronization needs of their applications. Given how crucial it can be for certain applications to have precise time synchronization, it follows that in order to protect the functioning of those applications, one should protect the functioning of PTP. Securing PTP was not initially a high priority due to it being utilized in small, private networks and due to the limited number of applications that used it. However, as PTP networks are growing in number and size, securing PTP is becoming more important. With a new version of the standard currently being worked on, now is an opportune moment to take a closer look at the new security proposal to assess its feasibility.
The focus of this work is on establishing the feasibility of the newly proposed security mechanism for IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol, specifically, its integrated security mechanism, in the context of usage in the power grid, as specified by the IEEE C37.238 Power Profile [3] .
II. BACKGROUND Security in IEEE 1588 was only addressed in the current version of the standard as part of an informative, experimental section, Annex K. However, due to a number of problems documented by several authors [4] [5] [6] , Annex K was not This project was supported in part by an award from the National Institute of Standards and Technology grant program 2016-NIST-MSE-01. widely adopted. This has led to renewed efforts to define a better security mechanism in the next version of IEEE 1588 [7] that forms the basis of this work.
The security proposal in the new IEEE 1588 standard builds off of Annex K, and maintains the goals of providing message integrity, source authentication, and replay attack protection. An informative security annex describes a four-pronged approach to security [7] ; our work focuses on Prong A, an integrated mechanism based on an AUTHENTICATION TLV in conjunction with either immediate or delayed security processing.
A. Prong A Overview
There are three main components to Prong A: the definition and use of an AUTHENTICATION TLV, a verification approach, and an associated key management protocol. The AUTHENTICATION TLV is used to carry security-related information necessary for calculating an integrity-check value (ICV) in order to provide integrity and authenticity. The verification approach refers to whether ICV verification is done immediately upon reception of a message, or if messages are stored and verified some time later; the former is referred to as immediate verification, while the latter is referred to as delayed verification. Finally, the key management protocol refers to the way in which security parameters are established and shared. The realization of the key management protocol is stated to be out of scope by the draft standard. However, due to the interdependence of the verification approach and the key management protocol, certain key management aspects cannot be completely ignored and so they appear throughout the draft standard. Key management will therefore be discussed here to the extent that it is needed to clarify the usage of the AUTHENTICATION TLV.
B. Key Management
Key management is the means by which security parameters are distributed to PTP nodes. These security parameters include keys, key length, integrity algorithm type, ICV length, and verification approach. In the case of delayed processing, there are several other parameters as well that will be discussed later. Key management can be manual or automated. Automated key management protocols use Security Associations (SA) to group these parameters for a given set of senders and receivers, and store such SAs in a Security Association Database (SAD). The SAD thus holds information on how a given message gets secured. Similarly, a Security Policy (SP) dictates which messages require security, and are stored in a Security Policy Database (SPD).
C. AUTHENTICATION TLV
As with any TLV, the first field, tlvType, is the Type (defined here as AUTHENTICATION=0x000D) [7] , and the second field, lengthField, is the Length of the payload or the Value field of the TLV. The Value field in the AUTHENTICATION TLV consists of several subfields: SPP (security parameter pointer), secParamIndicator, keyID, a conditionally present disclosedKey, sequenceNo and RES (optional, and reserved for use in later revisions), and finally, the ICV.
The AUTHENTICATION TLV is appended to every PTP message that must be secured. Using a secret key and some message as inputs to a given algorithm, a unique ICV can be produced and appended to the message to provide integrity and authenticity. The ICV is calculated over the entire PTP message -including the header, payload, and possibly other TLVs -as well as the AUTHENTICATION TLV up to but not including the ICV field itself.
D. Immediate Verification
In immediate processing, a key management protocol is utilized by which all members of the network share all the necessary security parameters for calculating an ICV. Thus, both masters and slaves can protect outgoing messages by creating and appending an AUTHENTICATION TLV, and both can, immediately upon reception of such a message, verify the message authenticity and integrity by calculating the ICV and comparing it to the ICV contained in the received message's AUTHENTICATION TLV.
For a sender, the first step is to use the policy limiting fields (PLF) to query the SPD in order to obtain the relevant Security Policy. Policy limiting fields include sourcePortIdentity, domainNumber, and messageType, among a few others; these fields should provide enough information in order to determine the security policy, which indicates whether the message needs to be secured. If the message is to be secured, the SPD query should return a Security Parameter Pointer (SPP), 1 which is used to query the SAD and obtain the relevant Security Association (SA) for this message. The SA holds all the necessary parameters for constructing the AUTHENTICATION TLV and calculating the ICV, which in the immediate processing case, are: a keyID (which should indicate a key to use, perhaps as an index into a table), a key (or a key table), key length, integrity algorithm type, ICV length, and a sequenceID window. Knowing that the message is to be secured, the sender sets the SECURE flag in the flags field of the PTP header, and having all the necessary information from the SA, the sender begins constructing the AUTHENTICATION TLV. Finally, using the integrity algorithm type and the key given by the SA, the ICV can be calculated.
As with the sending case described above, the first step for a receiver is to use the PLF of the incoming message to query the SPD and obtain the security policy. This should be done before PTP message processing, and after PTP header processing. If the security policy indicates that the message should be processed for security, then the SECURE flag in the message's PTP header should be checked and verified that it is set, indicating that an AUTHENTICATION TLV should be present. The existence of the AUTHENTICATION TLV can then be checked (by verifying the tlvType field is SECURITY). Next, the SPP field in the received AUTHENTICATION TLV can be verified to match the SPP returned from the SPD query. The SPP can then be used to query the SAD and retrieve the SA for this message, which contains all the necessary security parameters required to calculate the ICV, which is compared with the ICV in the received AUTHENTICATION TLV to determine the integrity and authenticity of the message.
E. Delayed Verification
The delayed verification approach is dependent on an associated key management protocol that allows for delayed distribution of security parameters. TESLA [8] is one such key management protocol, and indeed, the delayed approach described in the security section of the draft standard is designed with TESLA in mind. We will describe delayed verification here as it would operate when paired with TESLA.
Compared with immediate processing, delayed processing requires additional security parameters, and results in asymmetry between master and slaves: only the master secures outgoing messages, and slaves must be able to buffer messages for later verification. The general idea is that, given a sender and receiver that are loosely time synchronized, and that have agreed upon a way to split time into uniform intervals, the sender uses a new secret key to secure messages sent during each new interval, and discloses each key to the receiver (so the receiver can verify the integrity of the messages secured with that key) only after some delay, after which the sender is no longer using it to secure any new messages.
In the initial bootstrapping phase, the following need to be established so that time may be split into uniform intervals: a start time T 0 , an interval duration T int , and a number of intervals N . The master then creates a one-way key chain
so that there is a unique key for each time interval, plus one extra keythe trust anchor -which is the only key from the chain to be securely distributed to all participating nodes during bootstrapping. Using a pseudorandom function (PRF) f (e.g., a keyed hash function), where f k (x) denotes hashing over x using key k, TESLA defines the one-way function for key chain construction as follows:
... One-Way Hashed Key Chain using F(k)
Fig. 1: Key chain construction
The master picks a random value for K N , which will be the last key to be used, corresponding to the last time interval N , and recursively generates the keychain by K i = F (K i+1 ). For example, K N −1 will be produced via F (K N ), i.e., using the PRF f to hash over 0 using K N as a key. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Since the chain is recursively generated using a oneway function, K 0 -the last key to be generated -cannot be used to derive any of the other keys; it can only be used as a means to verify the authenticity of previous keys in the key chain (or later keys in terms of time intervals). This is a crucial property of the delayed verification scheme using TESLA for key management: a key K i corresponding to interval i cannot be used to derive future keys K i+x , where
The other parameters established at start up are the disclosure delay d, an estimated upper bound on the offset from master D t , and another pseudorandom function f which will be used to derive ICV-keys from key chain keys. The disclosure delay is measured in number of time intervals, and specifies when each key may be disclosed: K i , used to secure messages sent during interval i, may only be disclosed in interval i + d. D t is used by slaves when receiving messages to determine whether they are 'safe' or not; this will be discussed below, as we look at the control flow for both sending and receiving. The other pseudorandom function f is needed because the same key should not be used for multiple cryptographic operations [8] , and thus since a key chain key K i corresponding to interval i was used in the operation of deriving the next key in the chain, it should not be used in the separate operation of calculating an ICV for a message sent during interval i. Thus, we need to derive an ICV-key K i from the key chain key K i . The construction of the one-way function for ICV-key generation is done in a similar fashion as with Eq. 1, using a pseudorandom function f :
The control flow on the sending side for delayed processing begins in the same way as in the immediate case, with several interactions with the SPD and SAD to determine whether the message needs to be secured, and if so, with what parameters (found in the appropriate SA). Similarly, once the sender (master) knows that the message is to be secured, it sets the SECURE flag in the PTP header, and it begins constructing the AUTHENTICATION TLV. First, the master needs to determine the current time interval i:
This current time interval i determines the key to be used in securing the current message. It is also used to calculate the past interval for which a key should be disclosed. During interval i, the master should be disclosing key K i−d . Including a key directly in a message adds processing overhead; as such, the draft standard specifies that keys should only be disclosed in non-Event PTP messages. As in the immediate processing case, the SPP field is filled with the SPP obtained previously from the SPD lookup, while the keyID field in the delayed processing case is filled with the current time interval i. Finally, as with immediate processing, the ICV is calculated over the entire message up to the start of the ICV, using the integrity algorithm type given by the SA; the key to be used, however -ICV-key K i -is determined by the current time interval i, derived from
Processing inbound messages with the delayed verification approach begins the same way as with immediate verification, up until the presence of the AUTHENTICATION TLV has been verified, and the appropriate SA has been obtained. Knowing that the message should be processed according to the delayed verification scheme, the secParamIndicator must be checked to find out whether this message contains a disclosedKey.
At this point, the control flow consists of the following three steps: first, test if the received message is safe; second, deal with the disclosed key, if present; and third, buffer the message and proceed according to the mode of operation. The draft standard specifies two such modes of operation: authenticated and unauthenticated. In both modes, received messages are be buffered so that they may be verified later, when the appropriate key is disclosed. In authenticated mode, the contents of a buffered message are not used in any way until after the message is verified. This behavior is implicit in TESLA, and requires an implementation to be able to manage control flow such that a now-verified old message could be utilized during the security processing of the current message. In unauthenticated mode, after received messages are buffered, they are then used anyway, in spite of their integrity not being verified yet. This would require an implementation to be able to roll back the effects of a message that was already used but failed the ICV check.
Revisiting the three steps above, first the slave must test if the incoming message is safe. Once a key K i is disclosed in interval i + d, an attacker could use it to create a malicious message and secure it with an ICV calculated with the legitimate key K i . Thus, a message should only be processed if it is protected with a key that has not been disclosed yet and is known only to the master. This is defined as a safe key; a safe message is one whose ICV was calculated using a safe key. The safe message test thus ensures that the master could not possibly have been in interval i + d when a given packet was received. The security parameters necessary to determine the safety of a packet are: the start time T 0 , the interval duration T int , the disclosure delay d, and an upper bound on offset from master D t [8] . If the message is unsafe, it should be discarded; otherwise, security processing can continue.
For the second step, the slave must deal with the disclosed key, if it is present. In a given interval i, the master may disclose K i−d in several messages; thus, the slave must verify whether the currently disclosed key has been seen before, or whether it is new. If the key is new, its own authenticity must be verified by running it through the one-way function for key chain construction (Eq. 1) until arriving at a value equal to an earlier, already verified key, or the trust anchor, K 0 .
If the disclosed key K i−d is new (has not been seen before) and verified to be legitimate, it can be used to derive the corresponding ICV-key K i−d by running it through the ICV-key construction function (Eq. 2), which in turn can be used to verify buffered messages received in interval i − d. In authenticated mode, for each buffered message, if ICV verification fails, the message is discarded; otherwise, the message is verified and needs to be utilized. In unauthenticated mode, for each buffered message, if ICV verification fails, the effects of having already used the message must be undone; otherwise, processing can continue.
In the third step, attention is returned to the message at hand. The keyID field of the attached AUTHENTICATION TLV stores the time interval i in which the message was processed by the sender, which also reveals that the message is protected by an ICV calculated using the ICV-key K i ; thus the message should be buffered accordingly so it may be easily accessed when K i is later disclosed. In authenticated mode, the message that was just buffered should not be processed any further. In unauthenticated mode, it should be used immediately, at the risk that its effects will need to be undone later, should it fail verification.
III. SECURITY MECHANISM IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented Prong A of the security mechanism on top of PTPd [9] , an existing open source implementation of IEEE 1588. The main state machine is implemented in a forever loop, which consists of a switch on the protocol state (e.g., master, slave...), and function calls for handling incoming messages and issuing outgoing messages. On the sending side, security processing code was added after the outgoing buffer gets packed with the entire message, including the header, and just before the network component is invoked to send the message out. On the receiving side, we added security processing code immediately after a received message's PTP header gets unpacked into an incoming buffer, but before the rest of the message gets processed. For details on the implementation, see [10] . Here, we will focus on only the most interesting aspects, namely, those of slave receive processing when using delayed verification.
A. Delayed Processing Considerations
In the delayed processing case for incoming messages, after doing the initial checks on the received AUTHENTICATION TLV, we must do the safe packet test, deal with the disclosed key if it is present, and buffer the message. These last two steps differ slightly based on the mode of operation: authenticated or unauthenticated. First, we will consider the modes of operation, and then we will address the implementation of these three steps.
B. Mode of Operation
In authenticated mode, the first step is that the contents of a buffered message are not used in any way until after the message is verified; the second step would require an implementation to be able to manage control flow such that processing of a now-verified old messages could continue during the security processing of the current message. Our implementation is based on unauthenticated mode: in the first step, after received messages are buffered, they are then used anyway, in spite of their integrity and authenticity not being verified yet. In PTPd, this means simply letting control flow continue after security processing. The second step requires rolling back the effects of a message that was already used but failed the ICV check; this is an open problem in our implementation. Choosing to model unauthenticated mode allowed PTP to still function in our experiments, and leaves a clear point in the implementation where handling the undoing of messages that failed ICV verification can be inserted.
C. Safe Packet Test
For the safe packet test, we need the local time at which the packet arrived; the sender's advertised interval index, stored in the AUTHENTICATION TLV keyID field; and the start time T 0 , the interval duration T int , the disclosure delay d, and an upper bound on offset from master D t , all stored from the configuration file emulating an SAD lookup. If the packet proves safe, we can proceed with the next steps.
D. Disclosed Key Checks
The first step in dealing with a disclosed key is to determine whether a disclosed key is present. If not, we proceed to buffering the message. If we have a disclosed key, we must check if it is a new key. To implement this check, we keep track of the latest interval for which we have a verified key. Given current interval i and disclosure delay d, a disclosed key will be for interval i − d; we call this i d . As a new disclosed key for interval i d is verified, we update the latest interval for which we have a disclosed key accordingly to store the value of i d . Key verification is done by recursively running the new key through Eq. 1 until reaching the latest known verified key and comparing the results.
Once a key for interval i d is verified, it must be used to derive the corresponding ICV key with Eq. 2, which in turn is used to verify messages buffered during interval i d . If a disclosed key happened to be missed during one or more intervals, resulting in more than one buffer of unverified messages. In this case, when a disclosed key is verified, the verification process reveals the missing key(s) as well, and all unverified buffers are verified [10] .
Since we are modeling unauthenticated mode, the ICV verification for the messages in each buffer proceeds as follows: if the current message passes the verification, we leave it as is in the buffer and proceed to the next one, since it was already used back when it was initially received and buffered. If the message fails verification, it is marked as such in the buffer, and we proceed to the next message. After finishing the verification checks on all messages, we are left with a buffer containing the messages and an indication of whether they failed verification or not. At this point, a method to undo the effects of using any messages that failed verification is needed; this is left as a future work item.
E. Message Buffering
After checking if a packet is safe, and dealing with a disclosed key if present (which includes verifying previously buffered messages), we need to buffer the current message. Since we are modeling unauthenticated mode, we then let the rest of the PTPd code continue, and the contents of the message will be used normally according to the rules of PTP.
IV. EVALUATION
To evaluate whether implementing the proposed security mechanism in the context of the power profile is feasible, we verified the following: feasibility -the standard is specific enough to allow for implementation; functionality -the implementation does what it is supposed to do; and performance -the implementation performs at an acceptable level. We will discuss feasibility and performance evaluation below; for details on functionality testing and the systems used, see [10] .
A. Feasibility
As a result of this work, we have found that the security proposal in the IEEE 1588 draft standard is specific enough to enable the implementation of a functioning prototype of the security mechanism in the context of the power profile, albeit with a few caveats to be described in this section.
Regarding the power profile [3] , none of its specifications were found to prevent the adoption of the current implementation; however, employing the security mechanism would preclude the use of one-step mode, since ICV calculation done on the fly -after a timestamp is taken and inserted in the message -would significantly hinder timestamp accuracy.
The biggest limitation to our implementation is the lack of integration with an automated key distribution and management scheme; the related security parameters instead need to be specified in the configuration file passed to the daemon at startup, and maintained as part of PTPd's program state. This does not significantly hinder the immediate verification approach, but it does pose some unique issues for the delayed verification approach: trust anchor distribution, key chain expiration, and authentication modes. The first two stem from the lack of an automated key management scheme, while the lattermost relates to the underlying PTP implementation.
The trust anchor distribution and key chain expiration issues would both be resolved by integrating an automated key management scheme such as TESLA, while implementing the modes of operation would likely require modifications relating to the PTPd servo component. Due to each one of these issues, our implementation can serve only as a proof of concept. 
B. Performance
The goal of the performance testing was to measure how much time security processing adds to the normal functioning of PTPd. This was done by measuring elapsed time from the entry point of the security code to the exit point, with security disabled to get a baseline (effectively timing just a conditional statement that evaluates to false), and then for both the immediate and delayed verification approaches.
In order to get measurements on all message types for both master and slave, we inserted a timing probe to collect start times and end times around added security processing code. The timing probe consisted of a call to clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW, &ts). The first 1,000 measurements for each message type get recorded, for both master and slave states, for all message types, and for three different platforms -Linux desktop, Linux Raspberry Pi, and macOS laptop. Fig. 2 shows the median values for added security processing time for both verification approaches for the Linux desktop.
The expectation is that ICV calculation 2 would be the major contributing factor to processing costs. In the immediate verification approach, both master and slave incur processing costs on all sent and received messages, ranging from 5 to 18 µs. There does not appear to be a correlation between message size and processing cost; for example, in Fig. 2a , R PFU is double the cost of other messages of the same size. In the delayed approach, all outgoing messages from the master show costs on the same order of magnitude as with the immediate approach, ranging from 11 to 25 µs. On the slave processing side, we would expect General messages to incur additional costs due to key verification, and we do see this reflected in higher values for R ANN and R FUP, but not in R PFU. This may be because by the time a slave receives the first R PFU message in a given time interval, it may have already received and verified the disclosed key for that interval in a R ANN or R FUP message. Also, associated with key verification is ICV verification on all buffered messages corresponding to the newly verified key; this should incur a huge performance cost, but only for the subset of received messages that disclose a new key. Fig. 3 shows all 1,000 measurements for R ANN from a slave using delayed processing; in Fig. 3a each measurement is arranged in the order the messages were received, and in Fig. 3b measurements are sorted by value (referred to as CDF for cumulative distribution function). In Fig. 3b we see that 800 of the received messages incurred a minimal cost of approximately 5.82 µs, while 200 of the received messages incurred a much higher cost in the range of 350-400 µs. These spikes indicate the verification of a key and the subsequent ICV verification of all corresponding buffered messages; the periodicity of these spikes (Fig. 3a) reflects the fact that this event happens only once per time interval. Considering the time interval duration was set to 5 seconds, and the Announce message interval rate is 1/s, this is exactly what we would expect to see. In order to establish the feasibility of the proposed security mechanism for usage in the power grid, we implemented Prong A of the proposed security mechanism [7] on top of an existing PTP implementation, PTPd, configured according to the power profile.
Our implementation supports the immediate verification security approach using manual key management at startup; a variable length AUTHENTICATION TLV; two ICVcalculation algorithms, HMAC-SHA256 and GMAC; emulates interaction with an SPD and SAD, with the aim of facilitating future integration with automated key management; and it supports the delayed verification security approach, emulating automated key management for one set of security parameters corresponding to one manually-configured time period.
In terms of performance, the added time needed to do security processing for both approaches was within 25 µs. In the immediate approach, there is a more uniform cost across all messages; in the delayed approach, emulating the unauthenticated mode, there is minimal cost for most messages as ICV calculation is not done immediately, and a significant cost an order of magnitude higher on the messages that contain a new disclosed key, as they trigger bulk ICV verification on previously buffered messages. We have not found evidence that these performance costs hinder clock synchronization. Future work items include integrating automated key management schemes specifically designed for use with immediate verification and delayed verification with the security mechanism, and addressing the issue of authentication modes in delayed processing.
